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Introduction
Why, despite an abundance of resources and a more pluralistic political settlement, has 
Iraq’s economic reform process failed to take off since 2003? A large literature in political 
economy posits a curvilinear relationship between political liberalisation and better eco-
nomic policy; in which a transition away from a highly repressive but stable authoritarian 
regime does not immediately result in better economic policy; even if this is possible in 
the future. This paper explores the link between the evolution and consolidation of Iraq’s 
post-2003 political settlement and the way this has impacted on the nature of economic 
policymaking using the insights of this broader political economics literature. Paradox-
ically, the fact that the post-2003 political settlement has accommodated more groups 
than its repressive predecessor has not resulted in more inclusive, long-term oriented and 
programmatic economic decision-making. This is because the inclusion of more short-
term oriented (elite) groups reflects the fact that more actors can now generate violence 
if they are not placated with state-generated rents. Consequently, Iraq’s transition from a 
highly repressive limited access order (LAO) to a more fragmented, if pluralistic, fragile 
limited access order (FLAO) has exacerbated incentives for decision-makers to pursue 
more short-termist policies that have diverted resources away from long-term productive 
investments and reconstruction towards a focus on satisfying ethnic and religious clien-
telist networks.
Specifically, the consolidation of the FLAO in Iraq has coincided with a deterioration 
in the quality of regulation and a shift in the focus of government expenditure towards 
the expansion of superfluous public sector employment at the expense of long term-ori-
ented public goods generation such as investment and reconstruction. However, while 
the consolidation of the FLAO has resulted in a formidable self-reinforcing equilibrium in 
which incentives for sound economic reforms are limited, this does not mean that such 
reforms cannot be exogenously incentivised. By focusing on reforms that do not directly 
undermine the short-term ability of the political elite to distribute oil rents but subtly 
embedding technically-oriented reforms that create incentives to move away from the 
FLAO in the long run, it is possible for Iraq to slowly move towards a more sustainable 
political economy.1 
Viable economic reforms are likely to include: (1) private sector development, such as 
banking reform and regulatory change; and (2) concessional and conditional recon-
struction instruments that foster better policymaking in the long run while also boosting 
short-term capital expenditure. These reforms may be feasible even though the long-term 
growth and prosperity of the private sector may undermine the FLAO. This is because 
This paper greatly benefited from feedback provided by Ranil Dissanayake, Toby Dodge, William Evans, 
Nick Lea and two anonymous peer reviewers. The views and opinions expressed are the author’s own 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of DFID.
1   Although identifying economic reform areas that do not antagonise vested interests is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for engendering economic reform, any such reforms will still require political will 
and support.
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these reforms do not directly impact the current elite’s ability to distribute rents and gen-
erate growth in the short run, while their long-term political implications are of limited 
concern to the myopic incumbents. Conversely, any reforms that directly undermine 
the short-term ability of the elite to redistribute oil rents will be resisted no matter what 
the economic returns are. Therefore, reforms focused on public financial management, 
anti-corruption or the rationalisation of the public sector are, despite their potential sig-
nificant short-term economic and governance dividends, unfeasible. 
Thus, understanding the political economy of the political settlement in Iraq can help 
us identify the specific sectors and tools that can incentivise economic reforms that will 
not be strenuously resisted and undermined by the political elite. Paradoxically, while 
long-term political change is essential for sustaining sound economic policies, this can be 
achieved by focusing on reforms that only affect the political equilibrium in the long-term.
Literature Review: The Limited Access Order Typology 
and its Variants
The link between the political settlement and the development outcomes of states 
(including economic policy) is now well-established.2 Douglas North and others devel-
oped the framework of LAO that has been used to understand the incentives faced by 
decision-makers in a wide variety of developing countries.3 The LAO framework postu-
lates an intimate link between the use of the state to generate rents and redistribute these 
amongst elites capable of generating violence. As this provision of rents keeps the elite 
members of the ruling coalition from inciting violence, the framework predicts a close link 
between economic policy (rent- generation and distribution) and the sustainability of the 
(non-violent) political process – as North and others explain:
[In most societies] No one…has a monopoly on violence. Establishing a society 
that fosters peace, specialization, and exchange requires the creation of incen-
tives for groups to compete peacefully rather than fight. An LAO reduces violence 
by forming a dominant coalition containing all individuals and groups with suf-
ficient access to violence that can, if they act unilaterally, create disorder. The 
dominant coalition creates cooperation and order by limiting access to valuable 
resources…to elite groups. Restricting support for organizations to elite groups 
magnifies the rents that elite groups receive… Because violence reduces elites’ 
rents, the existence of the rents can motivate credible commitments among elites 
that they will not fight each other.4
2   Jan Pospisil and Alina Rocha Menocal, ‘Why political settlements matter: navigating inclusion in pro-
cesses of institutional transformation’, Journal of International Development 29 (2017), pp. 551–8.
3   Douglas North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven Webb and Barry Weingast, ‘Limited Access Orders in the 
developing world: A new approach to the problems of development’, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 4359 (Washington, D.C., 2007). 
4   Ibid, p. 41.
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North and others have classified Iraq’s nascent post-2003 political settlement as a fragile 
state variant of LAO, a FLAO.5 The distinction between FLAO and LAO is that in the 
former each element in the ruling elite coalition has the capacity to unilaterally gener-
ate violence that can existentially threaten the political settlement, and not just disturb the 
generation of rents via violence. As a consequence of this fact, members of the political 
elite cannot credibly commit, ex ante, to support long-term cooperation. Therefore, deci-
sion-making is inherently unstable and individualistic, and the institutions of the state 
remain basic and myopic.6
An important assumption of the (F)LAO framework is the intricate link between eco-
nomic and political systems in potentially fostering a transition to a more stable and 
pro-development political settlement – open access order (OAO). The basic premise of 
the political settlement literature is that a transition towards a more pro-development 
trajectory requires the systematisation of both political and economic competition – as 
both reinforce incentives moving away from the LAO modus operandi.7 If there is a sig-
nificant gap between the levels of competition in the political and economic spheres, 
then the incentives to revert towards a LAO or FLAO will increase. Thus, political com-
petition in an economy that is characterised by oligopolistic or monopolisitic practises 
will encourage the transition to a more exclusionary political process; as elites will recon-
figure institutions in order to capture economic rents. In the reverse configuration of 
economic openness but political repression, economic competition will be undermined 
as rent-seeking and rent-extracting political actors use their insularity from competition 
to generate and capture rents.
The practical implication of the political settlement framework is that it allows us to 
link the macro-political environment to the costs of generating publicly funded goods 
vs. rents. Essentially, the real cost of public goods provisions should rise as we transition 
from a (non-violent) OAO towards a LAO, and even more so for a FLAO. This is because, 
as the probability of violence increases in the absence of rents, so does the opportunity 
cost of using public funds to generate public goods. The political settlement also helps 
explain another paradox, well established in the literature, that a shift from a relatively 
stable exclusionary regime to a more pluralistic but fragile one does not always result in 
better economic and governance outcomes. This is because increased pluralism does not 
represent the growing ability of groups to make programmatic demands from the state 
apparatus, but rather the fact that more groups have the power and credible threat of vio-
lence to disrupt the peace if they do not receive their share of rents.
The FLAO framework predicts that contexts like post-2003 Iraq will experience: (1) a 
rapid escalation in violence if a member of the elite settlement is excluded from the 
sharing of state rents (e.g. the Sunni Arab pre-2003 elite); (2) a reorientation of economic 
policy towards the short-term satisfaction of clientelist needs (public sector jobs and pen-
sions) over the long-term provision of public goods and reconstruction; and (3) if political 
5   Ibid. 
6   Ibid, p. 11.
7   Ibid, pp. 5–6.
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and economic reforms are to succeed, their interdependence in the short- and long-run 
needs to be well understood. More specifically, economic reforms should focus on areas 
that do not antagonise the elite’s ability to generate and distribute rents in the economy, 
but on generating new growth areas – especially ones, such as private sector development, 
which might allow for new voices demanding political reforms in an incremental manner 
to emerge. North and others postulate that the possibility of a LAO moving towards an 
OAO framework is a long process and requires the elite to gain incentives to generate 
institutions such as the rule of law to a growing proportion of the population, because this 
creates economic growth, a proportion of which can be expropriated as rents. Therefore, 
long-term patient and pro-growth economic reforms, that do not antagonise the elite’s 
short-term rentier objectives, are likely to yield the best results.8
The political settlements literature clearly links to a broader literature regarding institu-
tionally-induced incentives of public officials to use public expenditures to generate public 
goods and/or rents.9 It is beyond our scope to review this literature in detail. However, the 
functional implications of the political settlement literature are very much in line with the 
expectation that different regime types will incentivise different spending patterns. Spe-
cifically, a shift from a LAO to a FLAO would shift public expenditure: (1) quantitatively 
away from programmatic expenditures (provision of public goods, public services, etc.) 
towards rents (excessive pensions, fake jobs, illegal payments) to political actors who, if 
not placated, can instigate violence; and (2) qualitatively towards the most credible type 
of rent extraction – the generation of public sector jobs and pensions that can quickly be 
delivered over rents from procurement or more long-term corrupt activities.
It is of course important to note the limitations of the FLAO framework in its ability to 
explain the entirety of the political economy of policymaking in Iraq. The determinants of 
economic policymaking are many and complex. We would, therefore, expect other factors 
to be able to account for some of the variation in economic policymaking. For example, 
some actors may be able to utilise narratives around nationalism, religion and national 
capacity to advocate for changes, such as electronic payroll systems, that enhance the 
capacity of the state (contrary to the expectations of the FLAO). However, we would 
expect that, controlling for these other factors, the change in incentives created by the 
post-2003 political settlement would still be able to account for a significant amount of 
the shift in the nature of economic policymaking. Therefore, our approach remains useful 
even if it cannot account for all the determinants of economic policymaking.
8   Ibid, p. 17.
9   For example: Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande, Lupin Rahman and Vijayendra Rao, ‘The politics of public 
good provision: Evidence from Indian local governments’, Journal of the European Economic Association 
2/2–3 (2014), pp. 416–26; Timothy Besley, Torsten Persson and Daniel M. Sturm, ‘Political competition, 
policy and growth: Theory and evidence from the US’, Review of Economic Studies 77 (2010), pp. 1329–52; 
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘Political institu-
tions, policy choice and the survival of leaders’, British Journal of Political Science 32/4 (2002), pp. 559–90; 
David Lake and Matthew Baum, ‘The invisible hand of democracy: Political control and the provision of 
public services’, Comparative Political Studies 34/6 (2001), pp. 587–621. 
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The Development and Institutionalisation of a Fragile 
Limited Access Order in Iraq Post-200310
Before 2003, Iraq was an exclusionary LAO in which many elements of the population, 
especially significant subsets of Shiʿa and Kurdish groups, were excluded from the polit-
ical process, often violently. Dissidence and genuine political participation were also 
severely restricted. The four stages of the emergence and consolidation of Iraq’s post-
2003 political settlement are summarised in Table 1.
The formation of a new political settlement entrenching the dynamics of a FLAO begun 
soon after 2003. In the first two years, the fact that economic policy was dominated by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) meant that the political settlement was effectively 
under the control of agents of a functional OAO. The transition to a politically indigenous 
political settlement was envisioned via the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
Paul Bremer’s ‘540-day plan’ to draft a new constitution, endorse it by referendum, and 
hold elections. However, Bremer’s attempts to ensure that the design of state institutions 
were inclusive ran into opposition from the six – subsequently seven – parties represented 
in the seven-person Leadership Council.11 These parties, which heavily represented groups 
excluded by Saddam’s regime, had conceptualised a sectarian-based political settlement 
soon after the first Gulf War. The proposed slow transition and possibility of a more inclu-
sive political settlement galvanised the six political parties to coalesce around demands 
for a faster transition.12
Due to increased violence in the latter half of 2003, as well as the pressure of domestic 
politics in Coalition countries to accelerate a transition out of Iraq, Bremer accepted the 
demands of the six parties to introduce the ‘Sallahuddin quotas’13 on the allocation of 
seats on the 25-person Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)14 as well as the right of existing 
members to veto the introduction of new members. This process effectively begun to 
entrench the power of these groups to gain exclusionary political control and, by exten-
sion, access economic rents that could be captured by the state. Thus, the creation of the 
IGC set in motion the establishment of a new FLAO.
10   The following section, describing the emergence and consolidation of Iraq’s new political settlement, 
is based on Toby Dodge, ‘Muhasasa Taʾifia and its others: Domination and contestation in Iraq’s politi-
cal field’, Religion, Violence, and the State in Iraq, POMEPS Studies 35 (October 2019), pp. 38–45. Available 
at https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/POMEPS_Studies_35.1.pdf (accessed 18 February 
2020).
11   Which also included Naseer Kamel al-Chaderchi.
12   Toby Dodge, ‘Elite pacts, political settlements and transition in Iraq’, London School of Economics: 
London [forthcoming], p. 10.
13   These are sectarian quotas dating from the October 1992 conference that formed the opposition Iraqi 
National Congress.
14   The distribution included 13 Shiʿa, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Turkoman and 1 Christian.
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Table 1: The Emergence and Consolidation of Iraq’s Post-2003 FLAO Political Settlement
Time Period FLAO Elite Actors Excluded Actors External Actors
Pre-2003 Conceptualising the sectarian quota system
Exiled groups begun to articulate a post-
Saddam regime that culminated in the first 
establishment of a sectarian quota system in 
1992 shortly after the first Gulf War.
Sunni groups, historically co-opted by Saddam 
Hussein, were underrepresented at these 
meetings.
2003–2007 Elites consolidate and entrench their power
By: (1) resisting the US-led Provisional 
Authority’s attempts to include other groups 
(beyond the original six)15 in decision-making; 
and (2) ensuring the draft constitution 
embedded their preferred sectarian quota 
system into the subsequent electoral process.
While the speaker of parliament was Sunni, the 
Sunni population lost its historical privileged 
access to the political system, and therefore 
the level of economic rents it had historically 
received. By 2006, insurgencies in Arab Sunni 
areas begin to accelerate.
Despite the attempts by Coalition Provisional 
Authority Head Paul Bremer to (1) involve new 
stakeholders, (2) the fact that all ministries had 
a US adviser, and (3) the US was responsible 
for the bulk of security, the ‘original six’ were 
able to use the threat of a boycott to frustrate 
attempts to move towards a political system 
that threatened their dominance of the levers of 
the state. 
2007–2011 Consolidation
Following the introduction of the new 
constitution in 2005 and the elections in 2006, 
the consolidation of power by the new elite 
took place. Rapid reorientation of economic 
policy towards (clientelist) public sector job 
generation begins.
The promise made by the government to 
provide support for the Sunni tribes that fought 
against insurgents was an important factor in 
improving the security situation.
Despite a surge in US troop numbers, the ability 
(and willingness) of the US-led Coalition to 
prevent the entrenchment of the new FLAO 
diminished as the focus was on security and 
securing an exit from Iraq.
2012–2017 Full institutionalisation
Attempts to develop non-sectarian parties 
thwarted. Short-termism clientelist focus 
continues unabated.
The failure to accommodate Sunni tribes that 
fought insurgents results in escalating violence 
and the rapid expansion of insurgent violence.
Allied surge and support provided the 
government with the ability to defeat 
insurgency. 
Post-2017 The inclusion of some more Sunni elements facilitates an end to violence, while high oil prices ensure that members of the FLAO elite settlement have 
sufficient resources to satisfy expanded clientelist needs at least for now.
15   The original six are the opposition parties that had coalesced around the idea of sectarian quotas while still in exile.
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The power of the new elite settlement to further entrench its ability to control the state 
apparatus was demonstrated in 2004. The six parties were then able to scupper a plan 
by UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi aimed at ensuring a transitional govern-
ment was composed of technocrats rather than representatives of the IGC. This would 
have deprived the six parties of an incumbent advantage in the upcoming elections. By 
threatening to withdraw their support of the transition process, the six parties were able 
to pressure the Coalition into accepting the role of the continued centrality of the IGC in 
the transition period.
In January 2005, the elite coalition was able to use the reliance on the Sallahuddin quotas 
during Iraq’s first election to entrench its control of the levers of the state. While this 
election was for a temporary assembly, the role of this assembly was to draft the new Iraqi 
Constitution, thereby providing the elite with the ability to rig the new ‘rules of the game’ 
in its favour. The power of the insider coalition to exclude new entrants into the political 
process could be seen by the fact that attempts by the Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani to facil-
itate the inclusion of independent candidates into the Shiʿa electoral lists were resisted by 
the Shiʿa parties in the IGC. The growing power of the parties in the elite coalition to seize 
economic rents and use these to reward clientelist networks can also be seen by the volte-
face of the Iraqi Islamic Party, whose support base is Sunni. Having decided to boycott 
the January 2005 elections, the party, realising the potential dangers of political isolation, 
organised a larger electoral coalition and participated in the December 2005 elections (at 
which turnout increased from 68 to almost 80 percent).
The new Iraqi Constitution realised the entrenchment of the elite settlement, reward-
ing the insider parties with the tools to perpetuate their ability to distribute ministerial 
and senior public sector roles along sectarian lines, and use these roles to support clien-
telist networks. However, the fragility of the new political settlement was soon exposed 
when Sunni tribes in central Iraq, who had traditionally enjoyed access to political rents, 
increasingly begun to back insurgent movements. As anticipated by the FLAO model, the 
failure to provide these actors with sufficient access to economic rents resulted in the 
rapid escalation of violence and the loss of large parts of territory threatening not just 
the generation of rents but also the very integrity of the state. The government was only 
able to reverse this situation through relying on external military support and the better 
inclusion of these groups in the political settlement by granting them access to public 
sector jobs. The fact that the exclusion of even a relatively small minority from the politi-
cal settlement resulted in a rapid deterioration in security underscores the fragility of the 
regime, which despite vast oil wealth – and therefore rents – lacks the capacity to ensure 
a monopoly of violence in the face of minority opposition.
Alexander Hamilton 13
A Simple Formalisation
In order to better understand how the transition from a LAO to a FLAO settlement 
impacts on incentives for economic policy, it is useful to generate a simple moral hazard 
principal–agent model.16 Assume a rent-maximising incumbent ( ) is randomly installed 
in power in the first period ( ) of a two-period game. The incumbent has the ability to 
use an (exogenously fixed) level of taxes ( ), subject to the constraint that tax is less than 
total national income ( ), to generate: (1) private rents for herself; and/or (2) the 
provision of public goods ( ) to all citizens ( ). In order to capture the effect of the polit-
ical settlement, we introduce a parameter  that denotes the proportion of discretionary 
resources that need to be used to ‘buy the peace’ by elite actors. That is the level of rents 
that need to be generated in order to avoid violence and therefore (1) the destruction 
of public goods and (2) the incumbent’s ability to retain office into the second period. 
Thus, by definition .17 As, by assumption, elites can generate more violence in a 
FLAO than a LAO, we can also assume that .18 Given the incumbent’s 
rent-maximising preferences, positive discount factor ( ) and a positive ego rent ( ) for 
remaining in office into the second period, the incumbent’s utility function is:
(1.01)
Citizens can credibly commit to acquiescing to the incumbent remaining in office if they 
receive a certain quantity of public goods ( ). As the generation of public goods requires 
the forfeiture of rents, the citizen’s utility function can be written as:
(1.02)
From this utility function it is possible to derive the set of strategies available to citizens 
at the end of the first period:
(1.03)
The decision of the incumbent centres on whether it is optimal for her to commit to the 
supply of the minimum amount of public goods required to stay in office, enjoy residual 
rents in the first period and the net present value of second period rents; or rent-maximise 
( ) in the first period and be removed from office.
16   The model here is a simple adaptation of the canonical two-period principal –agent model introduced 
in Tim Besley, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008).
17   For simplicity and given the substantive assumption that rent generation is critical for both LAOs and 
FLAOs, we assume that .
18   For simplicity we assume no corner solutions.
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That is: 
(1.04)
The timing of the game is as follows: (1) nature assigns an incumbent into office; (2) 
citizens credibly commit to the continuation of the incumbent in office if a threshold of 
public goods is realised at the end of the first period; (3) the incumbent either (a) pro-
vides a combination of public goods to citizens and extracts residual rents, or (b) rent 
maximises in the first period; (4) citizens observe the actions of the incumbent; and (5) 
either (a) revolt, or (b) acquiesce to the incumbent staying in power; (6) the incumbent is 
either (a) removed from office, or (b) remains in office for the second period and pursues 
a policy of maximal rent-extraction. 
Proposition 1a: If   and  there exists a (pure strat-
egy) equilibrium in which an incumbent provides the minimum combination of public 
goods to remain in office while using any residual resources in order to generate rents. All 
citizens receive any public goods provided and the incumbent survives into the second 
period.
Proposition 1b: If  there exists a (pure strategy) equilib-
rium in which an incumbent pursues maximal rent-seeking, fails to produce a sufficient 
amount of public goods, and is removed from office at the end of the first period.19
Intuitively, the model allows us to begin unpacking the different incentives an incum-
bent officeholder faces when considering her optimal response to the demands of citizens 
given a political settlement. Specifically, if we know how a change in the political settle-
ment can affect the relative costs of different choices, we can use this simple model to 
make predictions about how changes in the political settlement will impact on the relative 
provision of public goods, rents and by extension the myopia (or lack thereof) of incum-
bent decision-makers.
Comparative Statics: A Transition from a LAO to a FLAO
We can use the model above to explore the likelihood of different substantive outcomes 
(levels of corruption and public goods generation) from shifting from a LAO to a FLAO. 
Specifically, we can explore how the incentives of an incumbent in a LAO in which the 
inequality  and  is just satisfied changes when we 
shift to a FLAO. Essentially, the shift to a FLAO means that the value of  has increased. 
What happens to the incentives of the incumbent as ? That is ? On the margin, 
19   For our purposes, analysing the effects of shifting from a LAO to a FLAO, the analysis of 
these two pure strategy equilibria will suffice. There are also other pure strategy equilibria, e.g. 
 and  but these do not add significant value to our illustrative 
purposes. 
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an increase in the value of  would mean that the real return of short-term rent-extraction 
now becomes greater than limiting rent extraction in the first period and providing public 
goods. This is because the incumbent is now better-off rent-maximising in the short 
run than forgoing some rents in the first period. So, the likelihood that incumbents will 
become more myopic and extract more rents increases as we shift from a LAO to a FLAO 
(see Annex A).
Empirical Implications
The transition from an elite settlement with a unified and exclusionary executive LAO 
to one in which a large number of independent incumbents control their own portfolios 
with little to no effective cooperation (FLAO) describes the change in decision-making in 
Iraq. We can use the comparative statics of the above model to generate two predictions 
of how Iraq’s transition to a FLAO will impact the nature of economic policymaking:
H
1
: The provision of public goods by (domestic) actors will declined as the political set-
tlement switches from a LAO to a FLAO.
H
2
: The aggregate generation of rents will increase as the political settlement switches 
from a LAO to a FLAO.
We can now review each hypothesis to determine the utility of the FLAO framework.
Empirical Analysis
The aim of the empirical analysis is to identify whether the theoretical hypotheses gener-
ated by our simple formalisation can predict the evolution of decision-making in post-2003 
Iraq. There is a large literature linking the movement away from a stable and mature auto-
cratic or liberal democratic regime to worse governance outcomes.20 The methodological 
challenge of doing this is that outcomes of interest (pattern of expenditure, regulatory 
quality and levels of corruption) are not solely determined by the political settlement. In 
order to identify the possible contribution of the political settlement, we focus on the rel-
ative change in variables of interest over time. Specifically, since the political settlement 
begun to emerge after 2003 and had solidified by 2010, it is possible to examine whether 
there were detectable changes in economic policy outcomes associated with the evolu-
tion of the new political settlement.
20   For example: Gabriella Montinola and Robert Jackman, ‘Sources of corruption: A cross-country 
study’, British Journal of Political Science 32/1 (2002), pp. 147–70; Patrick M. Regan and Errol A. Hender-
son, ‘Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: are democracies internally 
less violent?’, Third World Quarterly 23/1 (2002), pp. 119–36; Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza and 
Todd Sandler, ‘Regime types and terrorism’, International Organization 71/3 (2017), pp. 491–522.
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Explanatory Variable of Interest
The development and entrenchment of the current political settlement ( ) in Iraq 
did not occur instantaneously. Rather it manifested, evolved and consolidated over time. 
Therefore, we would expect the impact of the post-2003 settlement to become more pro-
nounced over time. Specifically, given the fact that the US-led Coalition was responsible 
for the administration of much of Iraq immediately after 2003, and control only fully 
reverted to national political actors in 2011, we would only expect the full impact of the 
new political settlement to manifest itself post-2010.
Dependent Variables
Given the consolidation of the political sentiment described above, good independent 
variables of interest would seek to measure: (1) the overall provision of public goods and/
or financed goods and services ( ); or (2) the level of rents ( ) generated in the economy. 
There are several methodological challenges in identifying variables that can effectively 
measure such dependent variables of interest. In respect to the generation of public goods 
it can sometimes be difficult to measure the quality of outputs (e.g. regulatory quality, 
quality of public services, etc). In respect to rents, given the sometimes-illegal nature of 
the transfers and/or their disguise as legitimate public expenditure, it can be difficult to 
determine their actual size and trajectory. 
In order to minimise the risk that the indicators used do not reflect the overall trajectory 
of public sector outputs and rents we use (1) a combination of different variables mea-
suring regulatory quality and rents; (2) combined with public financial data. The idea is 
that, if all these indicators are moving in the same expected trajectory, the political set-
tlements theoretical approach has some merit. Specifically, we explore aggregate World 
Bank indicators of the quality of regulation and political stability ( ) and corruption ( ), 
the comparative performance of Iraq in the Doing Business Index (capturing a mixture 
of ( ) and the evolution of expenditure data in Iraq – especially capital (long-term 
investment ) vs. current (salaries and pensions, some of which may be legitimate, but 
whose unjustified growth may signal a growth in ).
Figure 1 provides an initial overview of the relative evolution of Iraq against three of the 
World Bank’s Good Governance Indicators. These should provide a good, albeit high-
level, snapshot of how the evolution of the regime has resulted in qualitative changes in 
different elements of governance that correspond to H
1
-H
2
. This is because these indica-
tors are designed to capture both the provision of public goods (good quality regulation 
and its implementation) as well as the magnitude of some types of corruption (rents).
The World Bank’s ‘Regulatory Quality’ indicator is designed to ‘capture perceptions of 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development.’21 It therefore captures a critical 
21   ‘Good Governance Indicators’, World Bank (Washington, D.C., 2019). Available at https://info.world-
bank.org/governance/wgi/#home (accessed 18 February 2020).
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dimension of whether the state can generate public and merit goods (H
1
). Focusing on the 
change of regime in 2003, the relatively low ranking of Iraq (tenth percentile) improves 
as the reconstruction process begins, reaching the high teens in 2009. However, with the 
consolidation of the new political settlement and the diminished direct Coalition control 
of governance, the indicator begins a steady decline thereafter. Control of corruption 
(proxy for H
2
) follows a similar pattern, starting from a low base, improving until 2011, 
and then declining. Finally, relative political stability improves until the advent of the 
insurgency in late 2011 (H
1
). Thus, despite the huge investment in Iraqi military capabil-
ities, the lack of inclusion of Sunni elites in decision-making regarding the redistribution 
of rents is a better predictor of political stability. The movement of all these indicators is 
therefore consistent with the expectations of the model. As the new political settlement 
consolidates, the quality of decision-making declines, rents and corruption increase, and, 
despite the inclusion of more elite groups, sectarian violence is exacerbated.
Figure 1: Good Governance Indicators in Iraq
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Source: World Bank22
22   Ibid. 
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As Figure 2 illustrates the relative decline of public goods provision (H
1
) can also be 
seen from the ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index. While Iraq’s overall business environment 
started in 2004 above the MENA average and neighbouring Jordan, it has fallen behind 
since. Therefore, while there has been some absolute improvement in Iraq’s performance 
since 2009, this has been very slow. As a consequence, in relation to its regional peers, the 
relative cost and complexity of business registration and operation in Iraq has increased 
in recent years, as the political settlement has consolidated, even if there has been some 
improvement in absolute terms.
Figure 2: Ease of Doing Business in Iraq
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Source: World Bank23
We can further investigate the qualitative decline of decision-making by looking at 
the nature and trajectory of government expenditure (H
1
-H
2
). If our theoretical model 
is correct, we would expect a gradual decline in the proportion of public expenditure 
devoted to long-term investment in favour of short-term recurrent spending that can be 
used to reward clientelist stakeholders with government jobs and handouts.24 Of course 
23   ‘Doing Business Index’, World Bank (Washington, D.C., 2019). Available at http://www.doingbusiness.
org/en/rankings (accessed 18 February 2020).
24   Spending that falls under the more long-term oriented capital account is still likely to be subject to 
significant corruption and rent-extraction. However, in the absence of total expropriation, this type of 
spending is less likely to yield ‘privately optimal outcomes’ for corrupt clientelist networks. The deliv-
ery of permanent jobs has fewer transaction costs and delivers more long-term benefits for clientelist 
recipients than trying to extract rents from procurement contracts. Therefore, the relative proportion 
of state expenditure on capital vs. current budgets is an important, if imperfect, proxy for the emphasis 
on clientelist expenditures.
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the biggest determinant of government expenditure is oil prices, with over 90 percent 
of public revenue deriving from oil exports. However, as Figure 3 below indicates, the 
proportion of spending devoted to capital vs. current expenditures has declined as the 
political settlement has solidified – with capital expenditures almost halving from 18 to 10 
percent of GDP, while current expenditures have risen from less than 25 to over 30 percent 
of GDP in 2014–18. Of course, part of the fall in capital investment can be explained by 
the fall of oil prices since 2016. However, the fact that current expenditure has increased 
in both absolute and relative terms since 2014 clearly indicates that the prioritisation of 
public expenditures, given different oil prices, has become more oriented towards the 
provision of public sector jobs and pensions.
Figure 3: Composition of Public Sector Expenditures in Iraq
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We can even explore the extent to which expenditure has become more clientelist by 
examining the explosion of the public sector payroll. It is a well-known fact that govern-
ment jobs and payments are an important and credible mechanism for clientelist politics. 
Therefore, despite the worsening of the quality of government outputs (Figure 1) the size 
of the state has grown exponentially. As Figure 4 shows, the size of the public sector has 
increased from just over 900,000 in 2003 to over 3 million by 2015. The proportion of the 
public budget going to pay salaries has increased from 7 to just over 40 percent, while the 
public sector now accounts for 4 in 10 jobs in the country.
25   ‘World Economic Outlook’, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C., 2019). Available at https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 18 February 2020).
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Figure 4: Growth of Public Sector Payroll in Iraq
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Policy Implications 
The self-reinforcing incentives generated by the political settlement in Iraq make it imper-
ative to identify economic reforms that can facilitate both economic growth and political 
transition in the long run (t
2
). Like any other political settlement, reforms that have a high 
short-term (t
1
) political cost will be difficult to implement. Given that in a FLAO high short-
term political costs could result in state disintegration and not just incumbents losing 
their position, the net impact of certain reforms can be particularly profound. Therefore, 
while from an economic perspective redirecting resources away from public sector salaries 
towards human capital investment and infrastructure building could be transformational, 
it would also likely result in political instability and violence. Partially counterbalancing 
this tendency is high youth unemployment and a lack of opportunities that are likely to 
create increased pressures for economic reform, such as the 2019–20 protests.
As Table 2 shows, given the regime’s fragility, technically-oriented reforms around 
public financial management and/or anti-corruption which could threaten the ability of 
26   ‘Iraq – Systematic Country Diagnostic’, World Bank (Washington, D.C., 2017). Available at http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/pdf/IRAQ-SCD-FINAL-cleared-02132017.
pdf (accessed 18 February 2020).
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incumbents to redistribute oil rents are unlikely to enjoy much traction. Conversely, as 
long as they do not directly disturb the ability of the elite to redistribute these rents, ini-
tiatives to support private sector development, even if they diminish the opportunities 
for petty corruption, may be feasible. This is because the growth of the private sector 
does not directly disturb oil revenue distribution and may even placate certain power-
ful groups. Another feasible option might be the use of conditionalities to fund capital 
expenditures in Iraq. Given the FLAO modus operandi means that the government 
itself has very limited incentives to invest in long-term reconstruction, providing finan-
cial support for reconstruction (that may generate short-term economic stimulus) while 
attaching requirements focusing on long-term structural reformation might yield both 
short-term and long-term results. In the short run, reconstruction expenditure could 
stimulate growth. The slow reform of the government sector, while not disturbing today’s 
incumbent’s ability to redistribute rents, could result in the long-term undermining of the 
FLAO settlement and promote its slow transition towards a more inclusive and produc-
tive modus operandi.
Table 2: Political Settlement and Reform Options in Iraq
High short and long-term economic 
reform impact (t
1
)
Limited short-term but high long-
term economic reform impact (t
2
)
High net political cost 
(t
1
)
• Restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises
• Public sector pension reforms
• Public Financial Management
• Anti-corruption reforms
Low net political cost 
(t
1
)
• Private sector growth facilitation
• Access to finance and banking 
reforms
• Concessional finance for 
reconstruction and long-term policy 
reforms
• Support of evidence-based 
policymaking (e.g. data generation 
and analysis)
The dynamic effects of sequencing the focus of reforms, on both economic and political 
equilibria, can enable over time the movement towards a more inclusive political settle-
ment.27 This is because, as Table 3 shows, the successful initiation of economic reforms 
will eventually have a spill-over effect in demands for change in the political settlement, 
which will in turn result in further incentives for economic reforms. Thus, the initiation 
of sound economic reforms can result in the multi-causal and self-reinforcing movement 
towards better economic and political equilibria in the long run.
27   It is important to note there is considerable debate around the link between economic and political 
reforms and how they affect each other. However, while no consensus exists, there is a growing accep-
tance, even amongst sceptics, that there are multi-causal links between the two. See: Staffan I. Lindburg, 
‘Introduction’ in ‘Should Modernization Theory Survive?’, The Annals of Comparative Democratisation 
16/3 (2018). Therefore, while the descriptions in Table 3 seeks to map out one plausible pathway linking 
economic and political equilibria, other mechanisms for affecting both are also likely to exist.
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Table 3: The Effect of Economic Reforms on Economic and Political Equilibria
Time Period Economic Equilibrium Political Equilibrium
T
1
High-economic impact, low short-term 
political cost reforms pursued (i.e. 
concessional finance, private sector 
reforms).
Largely intact (oil revenues for jobs). Some 
lower level bureaucrats may resist loss of 
discretion for petty corruption, but economic 
boost and prestige of better business 
environment keeps senior elite placated.
T
1+
Provision of infrastructure and private sector 
growth create jobs and economic stimulus. 
Expectations of (marginally) better 
service provision and delivery embedded 
(concessional finance); and private sector 
growth create greater political voice.
T
2
Diminishing economic growth due to the 
exhausting of ‘low hanging fruit’ economic 
reforms – growth increasingly dependent 
on governance reforms (e.g. anti-corruption, 
public financial management and rule of law).
The political benefits of continued economic 
growth, the relative strength of the private 
sector and the short-term political gains of 
maintaining growth may incentivise senior 
policymakers to pursue some governance 
reforms that improve efficiency and the rule 
of law while they still enjoy considerable 
fiscal discretion (to use oil revenues to 
create jobs).
T
3+
Political pressure to change fiscal policy 
(rent-allocation) builds up due to economic 
transformation. The social contract based 
on oil rents begins to change.
Strengthening rule of law, public financial 
management and anti-corruption make 
economic misallocation increasingly 
costly. The long-term effects of a more 
independent judiciary, anti-corruption 
efforts, expectations of service delivery, 
create pressures to make better spending 
decisions.
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Conclusion
The evolution of Iraq’s political settlement since 2003 has had profound implications on 
the nature of (economic) policymaking. Specifically, a more inclusive, albeit elite, political 
settlement has increased the incentives for incumbent policymakers to pursue short-
termist policies that focus on placating clientelist supporters rather than public goods 
provision. This is because, as the introduction of a sectarian system for allocating public 
office has developed and solidified, the relative cost of ensuring survival in office has 
shifted away from the provision of broadly available public goods towards the satisfaction 
of clientelist supporters. As such, the state has increasingly focused on the provision of 
public sector jobs while neglecting capital and long-term expenditures. 
This political equilibrium represents a significant obstacle to purely endogenous eco-
nomic reform. However, the myopia of incumbents can be used to support short- and 
long-term economic policy reforms that can transform both the economy and the political 
settlement. As long as they do not antagonise the short-term rentier objectives of incum-
bents, they have a reasonable chance of success. Specifically, private sector development 
and concessional capital support that can transform the political and economic space 
in the long run may be feasible, because neither will significantly impact on the ability 
of incumbents to redistribute (oil) rents today. Even though the growth of the private 
sector and the expectation of citizens to maintain investiture may undermine the (highly 
corrupt) political settlement in the long run, the rational myopia of incumbents, who are 
only concerned with their short-term survival, may work to entrench such reforms.
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Annex A
Proof of Proposition 1a
We show how a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists when incumbents do 
not play weakly dominated strategies (PSPBEW). 
In a situation in which the inequalities  and  are 
satisfied, the incumbent will provide the minimum quantity of public goods required to 
survive and use any residual resources to generate rents for herself. Deviating from this 
strategy will not be optimal. Firstly, if the incumbent increases the quantity of public goods 
( ), she will reduce her welfare (fewer rents –  ) without affecting her chance of retain-
ing office –  so 
she has no incentive to do this.
Conversely, if she reduces public goods generation by even a small quantity, she will lose 
the support of citizens and lose office, as the in the present period is less than the net 
present value of retaining office as  – therefore she has 
no incentive to do this. Citizens, who have credibly committed to supporting the incum-
bent if they obtain , will have no incentive to deviate from supporting the incumbent 
as they would get a payoff of zero in the first period instead of .
Proof of Proposition 1b
In a situation in which the inequality  is satisfied, 
the incumbent will have an incentive to pursue a rent-maximising strategy in the first 
period and forgo surviving into the second period. If the incumbent increased public 
goods production, she would reduce her welfare – even if she did survive in office as 
. So, she has no incentive to do this. As she 
is already pursing the maximal amount of rents , then she cannot increase her 
welfare further by extracting more rents.
Citizens, who can credibly commit to supporting the incumbent only if she generates 
, will have no incentive to deviate from this as they will get a payoff of zero instead 
of .
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